{
  "id": "medusa-group",
  "name": "Medusa Group",
  "aliases": [],
  "domain": "cyber",
  "country": "UNK",
  "category": "Cybercriminal group",
  "status": "tracked",
  "fielded": null,
  "operators": [],
  "summary": "Medusa Group has been active since at least 2021 and was initially operated as a closed ransomware group before evolving into a Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) operation. Some reporting indicates that certain attacks may still be conducted directly by the ransomware’s core developers.",
  "specs": [
    {
      "k": "sponsor",
      "v": "Ransomware-as-a-service operation",
      "src": [
        "mitre-g1051"
      ],
      "conf": "medium"
    },
    {
      "k": "active_since",
      "v": 2021,
      "src": [
        "mitre-g1051"
      ],
      "conf": "medium",
      "note": "At least 2021"
    },
    {
      "k": "attack_id",
      "v": "G1051",
      "src": [
        "mitre-g1051"
      ],
      "conf": "high"
    },
    {
      "k": "targets",
      "v": "The group is opportunistic and has targeted a wide range of sectors globally.",
      "src": [
        "mitre-g1051"
      ],
      "conf": "medium"
    },
    {
      "k": "techniques_count",
      "v": 57,
      "src": [
        "mitre-g1051"
      ],
      "conf": "high",
      "note": "ATT&CK v20.1"
    },
    {
      "k": "software",
      "v": "certutil, Medusa Ransomware, Mimikatz, PsExec, Rclone",
      "src": [
        "mitre-g1051"
      ],
      "conf": "high",
      "note": "5 malware and tool entries linked in ATT&CK"
    }
  ],
  "payloads": [],
  "variants": [],
  "art": "cyber",
  "image": null,
  "verified": null,
  "notes": "Medusa Group has been active since at least 2021 and was initially operated as a closed ransomware group before evolving into a Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) operation. Some reporting indicates that certain attacks may still be conducted directly by the ransomware’s core developers. Public sources have also referred to the group as “Spearwing” or “Medusa Actors.” Medusa Group employs living-off-the-land techniques, frequently leveraging publicly available tools and common remote management software to conduct operations. The group engages in double extortion tactics, exfiltrating data prior to encryption and threatening to publish stolen information if ransom demands are not met. For initial access, Medusa Group has exploited publicly known vulnerabilities, conducted phishing campaigns, and used credentials or access purchased from Initial Access Brokers (IABs). The group is opportunistic and has targeted a wide range of sectors globally. Description adapted from MITRE ATT&CK®, © The MITRE Corporation, used under the ATT&CK Terms of Use.",
  "changelog": [
    {
      "date": "2026-11-08",
      "change": "Entry created from MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v20.1 (group G1051)"
    }
  ],
  "url": "https://www.defensepedia.com/systems/medusa-group.html",
  "sources": {
    "mitre-g1051": {
      "title": "Medusa Group, Group G1051",
      "publisher": "MITRE ATT&CK",
      "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1051/",
      "published": "2026-07-31",
      "tier": 2,
      "checked": "2026-11-08"
    }
  }
}